There appears to be a connundrum nestled away in this problem. Illusion is slippery. As is Truth. Religious doctrines are diverse and anyone who believes there is but one true way is choosing a preference over all the other possible ways, seems to me. A successful actress who survived a devastating illness is a Buddhist. She presumably chose that discipline because it helps her focus on what matters in her life. The practice of meditation also helps her find purpose and serenity. Not a bad bargain. She is doing the best she can with what she has and knows. I have said there is usefulness in such things. But, no one need take my word for that. MJA knows. We do what works for us.

I finally got to read some of the author's remarks on his book: Is Consciousness Everywhere? It is out of MIT Press and the writer's name is Koch. The subject of the book bears at least a tangential relationship to the subject(s) of this post, seems to me. In an email to the MIT folks,I said I did not think the answer was yes, citing efforts to 'explain' consciousness ( Dennett and Combs), and a notion from Gerald Edelman, positing what he called primary consciousness vs higher-order consciousness. I also took issue with whether consciousness is everywhere. I just don't think so. Just don't see it, you see. Let's take a practical matter stance: the viral pandemic we are trying to dig ourselves out of.. would anyone sincerely suggest that Covid is conscious? How about chicken pox? Come on now.
Metaphysics has a place. Some things discussed by Jung and,Sheldrake were fantastical---until one lived through them and wondered: how the heck did/does that/those things happen? Well. They do I am not into miracles. Jung's notion of synchronicity is now believable to me, inasmuch as I have experienced it. Sheldrake wrote of pets who 'know' when their masters are coming home. Yeah, they do. But that is nothing more than primary consciousness. Conditioning.
Experience.
Does a microbe or a virus have where-with-all to add two and two? No. Not consciously. Not at all.
Remember: beliefs are shady. Dewey said so. If, and only if, I can get it through my library, I may read the book. I'm just curious, as when reading Jung and Sheldrake. Maybe, I'll learn something...or learn there was nothing to learn. We need to make mistakes. Dennett said so all good..

And all of the above is, as Cronkite used to say, the way it is.
Good night. And good luck. (that was Murrow...) I miss such wisdom.

I am interested in the Mahamudra and Dzogchen understanding and experiences of non-duality in relation to the interface of human consciousness and physical reality. I am not interested in who said what when. I am interested in an analysis of what non-duality could possibly mean in the context of knowledge about physical reality and the brain-mind relationship. Knowledge requires evidence and justified reason, hence in this topic physics and neuroscience, informed by phil sci and phil mind. What is mind? How can things non-trivially be one? What does this really mean, without vague handwaving kumbaya unjustifiable statements like 'we are all interconnected', or 'consciousness is everywhere' that become clearly nonsense when terms are defined and justifications are sought ? Where is mind as an outgrowth of the brain-body chemical machine, e.g. GWS, HOT, AST theories that have become prominent in neuroscience, and how does it relate to what we see when we rest in non-duality within meditation?

Where does that leave the picture/body distinction? If I see your body, does that mean my eyes must belong to it? How is it clear that you've got your own body? When I feel a pain I might say "ouch", which is a description of a state of affairs of the type: "it is raining". But if I make the claim that "my body is in pain", the subject of the sentence becomes an axiomatic assumption for purposes of a causal explanation of how said state of affairs came into existence, based on what we can say we know about the world. Or again, isn't it just an indemonstrable assumption that when, 20 minutes after ordering a pizza at a busy pizzeria, my number is called out and I stand up to pick up the order, that I in fact stand up? Would it make just as much sense if, after deciding to stand up, I remained seated and everyone else stood up instead? How is this last possibility precluded without the arguably indemonstrable and therefore arbitrary claim that "I have a body"?

Is Consciousness Everywhere? Yes and no. It is, I hold, the sum of human cognition. Although it lies in some primary form, within other animal life. Not viruses or bacteria. Anyone theorizing otherwise relies upon some abstract metaphysics ---as, perhaps, there is intelligent life on Mars. There are true paths. There is not only one. My brother and I have discussed consciousness and truth issues. We have similar and differing opinions from an experiential view. Try harder. Think better....best you can, and so on. Picture/body distinction? That is just another way of talking, after the non-duality/oneness of self. Time goes by. Terminology changes to suit convenience; choice and preference(s). The Next Big Thing is always exciting, until someone asks: but what if we look at it THIS way? The beat goes on.

Philip Goff defends panpsychism against dualism and materialism in his book, Galileo's Error. He also discusses the quantitative and the qualitative, pointing out that philosophy is mostly the latter. Strawson, Koch, Palineau and others are on board, more or less, with the panpsychism train, thus (I guess) Koch's question:: Is Consciousness Everywhere? So, is it? I don't think so. Water,electricity, molecules and quarks are not sentient life forms, of themselves. Most life, as we know it, depends on water and oxygen. I hope that's right anyway. Even with this fact---the fact that water and oxygen are quantitatives, it does not logically follow they are repositories of consciousness. Not in my Universe,. The sum, I'd argue, is greater than its parts. Now, admitted, I don't know what is in the Koch book. Haven't been able to get hold of it. I will read Palineau and Strawson when possible. Still like William James, though.

It should be generally agreed that the quantifiability of something does not for that reason alone entail its predication by consciousness. Why, however, would this be unconditionally precluded if our own individual consciousness by all appearances is itself tied to it: namely, the bio-chemical make-up of the brain and nervous system? If that assemblage of quantifiable matter can be "conscious", whether by identity with it or epiphenomenal upon its activity of material combination and interconnection, by what rule is it precluded to other combinations of matter, such as, for example, rocks, trees, clouds, etc.? As Professor Neuman has thought deeply on this matter, it may be helpful to seek his assistance on formulating such a rule.

Not sure where this is going, Daniel. I am not a professor. Your first two sentences are self-negating though words like 'should be generally agreed';; ' predication by consciousness' ' and, 'by all .appearances.' This sounds like the legalese litany I heard for thirty years. Look, if you have a better idea, forward it in unambiguous terms. You have critiqued me. Stand, and deliver. The professor put down was crude.

If consciousness isn't everywhere, as you suggest, where and how do you draw the line between where it is and where it isn't? Isn't pointing to ostensive examples of sentient life just reduplicating the problem is other terms; (to wit: where is consciousness? --where there is sentient life; where is sentient life? --where there can be consciousness)? Admittedly this can be a little tricky, since sometimes it's not entirely clear what we mean by "consciousness". One can speak, for example, of "collective consciousness" where, not tied to a single individual, also can not be tied solely to the bio-chemical make up the brain-matter of single individuals taken as a group. And if that's the case, how is it kept out of inorganic matter? (--Anyone who teaches something I call a professor, maybe a little too formally).

I suppose I was a little harsh. Did not recognize the notions of panpsychism, seeming to be pervasive now. I don't mind it. I just don't think it is right. I do not buy either dualism or materialism. Nor can I accept the metaphysics of the middleground. There is, of course, a lot of philosophical static now. No one is right, nor can we all be wrong. There are other minds---one suggested to me by Mr.Smith..He and I have had our differences. The book is Metazoa. By Godfrey-Smith. His notion IS more of a middleground. And he argues it convincingly. I hope to read the precursor book: Other Minds. I expect that may be more fundamental. But...i don't know. Yet. Oh. Godfrey-Smith is a oceanographer.
He has a prejudice towards aquatic lives. Nothing wrong with that either...
Carry on, Daniel.

Not sure how we can even speculate on a oneness of anything. But, we do. Ah, imagination...
Ah, philosophy...

Anirvachaneey - it is inexpressible. It is also unsatisfying.

And so, all of the previous, withstanding or not, how say ye regarding this pansychism thing? Is there consciousness in rocks,neutrons or atoms? If so, we should give credence to Dennett and his stances? ...Physical, design and intentional? This is not unconscionable. Or, unreasonable. But,...
Now, thinkers are thinking they know what Descartes thought. Moreover, they feel they can accurately assess what he REALLY thought. But that is not right either. The entire notion of panpsychism seems wrong. How many variations of dualism, materialism and physicalism may there be? The variations appear endless. Why, is this? Because there are no limitations on where philosophy may go, what it may say. There are no rules. No limitations. No 'estoppels' of action.

It might be argued that philosophy is harmless. It does no good, but does no harm. That is mistaken.
Words are powerful. Wherever they arise/emerge from. Those who deny they are influenced by philosophy are liars. The most dangerous of all.

Is it possible to approach the question from the other end? I mean, instead of asking "is consciousness everywhere?", could one ask, "is consciousness anywhere"? How is it clear that there is any consciousness at all? Hillary Putnam performs a famous thought experiment where he invites the consideration of being nothing more than a brain in a tank. All the perceptions of the world and everything else in one's life is to be thought of as a mere electrical stimulation communicated through the medium which fills the tank and controlled by a lab technician, while the subject brain has no access to anything outside the tank. Is it possible to perform the same thought experiment without the brain, i.e., as just a tank? The question is to my mind not altogether non-sensical, as specific contents must by definition be distinct from the consciousness which is had of them, and consciousness in the abstract, independent of potential contents, resists sufficient analysis.

It sounds like you're agreeing that such a thought experiment is intelligible and therefore possible. It's a way of saying that just because there's thought going on, you don't always need a brain to be doing it. It should be pointed out however that Putman's point was similar to Descartes' "evil genius" argument deployed in the Meditations, i.e. even if one is able to bring into question everything that can be doubted, it's not possible to doubt that one is doubting; hence I doubt, or "I think", therefore "I am". My point in taking the brain out of the tank is the same as taking the "therefore I am" out of Descartres' claim and leaving only the "I think". His conclusion amounts to a non-sequitur, as does your suggestion that being "untrained" and "non-believing" indicates a defect in the brain.

Certainly intelligible and possible. Here, in this show and in Adviatin thought, the I is questioned as opposed to the thinking. There is no difference between my defect and yours. We are all a part of the vat and tank. Existence comes from nothing.

Non-duality could be the state of things. I find it plausible, but not as plausible as the statement my brain is defective. That I take as fact and plunder still.

Your brain's not defective; it's your argument. I'm not granted any insight into your brain. What you say on the other hand indicates that from a pedestrian understanding of your subject an inference can be made about an under-trained concentration of living intra-cephalic matter that you for one reason or another have decided is identical with the thinking upon which that understanding is based. My subsequent remark was not intended to constitute an agreement with it. I said rather that the inference is a non-sequitur, Latin for "it doesn't follow". Granted, a good argument doesn't always have to be logically valid, but it doesn't hurt. Parminides also spoke of a non-duality of sorts, and gave several arguments to that effect in the pre-syllogistic period. I was a little surprised that his work didn't come up in the discussion.

Aristotle thought that thinking was most associated with the heart. He thought the brain was kind of like a spongy balloon, the main function of which was to release heat from the body when the viscera became too warm. Do you wish to assert that this oversight is due to a malfunction in the brain?

So by your account a healthy brain can hold a false belief without being damaged. Does that imply that a damaged brain can't hold a true belief without becoming healthy?

Correct. And by that same token you must be able to recognized a similar move in your position: On the one hand you've got sufficient experience and information to be confident that one's thinking is entirely dependent on, and in a basic sense identical with, physical processes in cerebral contexts; and on the other hand such physical processes are said to generate or at least necessarily accompany the thought processes apprehending this very observation. With the claim "I think, therefore my brain is active", the antecedent is denied by claiming "if my brain is not active, I don't think". Do I have this right?

Only with respect to the truth value of premise contents, not with respect to the logical validity of the relation of one premise to another. If you're making a claim of identity between mental states (thinking) and brain states (neurological processes), then where does that leave the relation between the bi-valence of truth value of premise contents and the neurological reaction to the stimulus of logical validity-recognition?

--but colleagues for now. Your post from July third went into quite a bit of detail, which I saw value in parsing out. Especially interesting in my view was your distinction between thoughts and beliefs. Thoughts, by your account, have to have a brain to be performed in. Like employees who can never clock out, thoughts can't be of any service without using the gray matter they've been trained to use. Beliefs, on the other hand, can exist outside of the brain, since a lot of brains are performing them at the same time, ("initially social" -your coinage), and therefore can be conceived extra-cranially, perhaps like soap bubbles or beachballs tossed back and forth at a thought party. Decisive to my mind however was that logical bi-valence by your account applies to both, which resulted in an ambiguity with regards to any purported brain dependency of truth-value. If I understand your view of Advaita philosophy, the brain could disappear and beliefs could still be all over the place, as represented by your term "undifferentiated Brahman" (June 20's post). Does my admittedly rustic paraphrase of your commendably comprehensive analysis fulfill the intended semiological contents of its distributed semantic representation?