The works of Derek Parfit (1942-2017) have had a profound influence on how philosophers understand rational decision-making, ethics, and personal identity. At the heart of Parfit's thinking are questions about how you should relate to your future self, and whether you should treat your future self any differently than other future people. So why does Parfit argue that it's wrong to place a special value on your own survival? What would it take to value others in the way that you value yourself? And how might we harness Parfit's insights to make the world a better place? Josh and Ray's present selves welcome back Parfit's former student David Edmonds, author of Parfit: A Philosopher and His Mission to Save Morality.
Josh Landy
Twenty years from now, will you still be the same person you are today?
Ray Briggs
Will you still have the memories and personality that make you you?
Josh Landy
And why do we think our future selves are so important?
Comments (63)
Harold G. Neuman
Friday, February 24, 2023 -- 11:03 AM
Is morality a dead issue? OneIs morality a dead issue? One moral philosopher has as much as said so on a blog post I read recently
(Within the last week). There was little response, at that time. The blog is from University of Oxford.
Daniel
Sunday, February 26, 2023 -- 12:29 PM
Does your question inquireDoes your question inquire about something which exists but has ceased to be an issue, or about something which does not but used to be? Has morality become issueless, or has it been dropped from the list of issues on account of its non-existence? The distinction is not a trivial one, as it determines whether or not your view is one of morality having become sufficient for purposes of internal regulation of social relations, or of morality never having had any relation to such regulation. In short, are you asking if morality no longer needs to be an issue, or if it never needed to be in the first place? It is sincerely hoped that this question is not too difficult for you, so that the kindness of an answer might be extended. For it seems to hinge directly on the issue raised in topic description above: Are individual interests and behaviors mere abstractions of collective ones?
Tim Smith
Wednesday, March 1, 2023 -- 5:36 PM
Daniel,Daniel,
To be clear, the topic description above your own is in the prompts below:
1. Why does Derek Parfit argue that it's wrong to place a special value on your own survival?
2. Should you treat your future self any differently than other future people?
3. What would it take to value others in the way that you value yourself?
4. How might we harness Parfit's insights to make the world a better place?
To this, Harold has added: Is morality dead? (This is not his question or view but that of another unnamed moral philosopher.)
Where do you draw "Are individual interests and behaviors mere abstractions of collective ones?" from this post, moral philosophy, or in particular, Parfit's views? Neither Parfit nor a large number of moral philosophers does this. Morality can die existentially or through lack of necessity or usefulness without abstracting people from collectives, and with or without technology (assuming your reply to Harold's non-sequitur "Yawn. Snore…" is a continuation of your divergence here.)
If we discuss Parfit, we must take his "egoist view" or all it lost, but good intentions. Personally, I would do that very thing, but as others have pointed out – where's the fun in that? If we are all Borg, there is no choice but to assimilate.
Serious question – are you interested in Parfit? If so, why? In fact, either way... why?
Tim
Daniel
Thursday, March 2, 2023 -- 1:29 PM
Edmond's book contains theEdmond's book contains the phrase "Mission to Save Morality" in the title. If there's nothing much to save why have a mission to do it? The inquiry to which you are responding concerns the referential significance of the phrase "dead issue", as attributable or non-attributable to morality. In review, it is asked whether people have already become as moral as they are going to get and therefore no longer need morality for practical guidance, so that humanity has evolved past it, or that it was never there in the first place, and has thus become a non-issue on account of its current recognition as such. Has it been used up and discarded, or was it just a tool which was thought to be in the toolbox but never was? Participant Neuman can not mean both. An answer "yes" is attributed to an unnamed moral philosopher, but until the question is understood it can't be known what is being affirmed.
The second issue you raise is the connection to the topic description, which I describe as a hinge between morality as either archaic or illusory, and interests (together with behaviors unintelligible without them) as individual or collective. This latter is drawn from the claim in the topic description that valuing one's own survival more than anyone else's violates some fundamental moral, social, or ethical principle. From what could such a principle derive other than the fact that one's own existence can't be understood unless everybody else's is first, so that even internal projects and goals are possible only when separated out from the collective ones containing them which they presuppose? If morality has become no longer an issue, then, as the unnamed moral philosopher supposes, it should indicate a change in the abstraction-requirement for understanding individual interests. This cannot be known however unless the cause of the change is known. Does this consist of morality's disappearance, or an understanding of its non-existence?
Tim Smith
Thursday, March 2, 2023 -- 11:53 PM
Daniel,Daniel,
At least in discussing Edmond's book, we have some common ground and answers at our fingertips, as we may never know the wiles of an unknown blogger whose only reporter is apparently sleeping.
Parfit has a mission to save morality, so there is something archaic or illusory or, most likely, something else entirely.
Morality is, in fact, alive, if not well. Parfit believed that morality was threatened by skepticism and moral nihilism and in need of saving, which is why he wrote 'Reasons and Persons,' the only book of his I've read if only poorly understood, and he's the exact "opposite" of an egoist. You have never read him, have you? Be honest. You would have called me out in my previous post if you had. Egoism is anathema to the man. Parfit sees morality as, at least in part, irreducible, and moral language as a hook to hang a foundation for objective moral truth and rational ethics to put down the skeptics and nihilism.
Parfit may agree that reasoning has removed the necessity for ethical reflection, but I doubt it.
As to your argument, make it. You know full well that morality is not a dead issue, as does the philosopher who supposedly said it. So, suppose, for the sake of your argument that morality is declining to the point of death, how does your hinge turn?
Then let's get back to Parfit or Edmonds' book and get at the prompts for this show, as that is the topic at hand. An excellent way to do this would be to morph your question - Are individual interests and behaviors mere abstractions of collective ones? into a much more germane one - Are individual interests and behaviors mere abstractions of one's past and future selves? That is a question that Parfit practically created and one that pins down views toward climate change and war.
You are always good for a rejoinder; let's rejoin the discussion.
Tim
Daniel
Friday, March 3, 2023 -- 11:11 AM
To which discussion do youTo which discussion do you refer, the one currently occurring? That would mean one is rejoining what is already joined, which is a contradiction. Also, in the fifth paragraph you've confused analysis of another's question with an argument of my own. No position is taken for my part on the issue of morality or even if it makes sense to make such a reference. On the issue however of what you're calling "past and future selves" and whether behaviors and their grounds of intelligibility are abstracted from them, one clarification should first be made: What's a future self and, if such a thing exists, how do you know it's yours?
Tim Smith
Saturday, March 4, 2023 -- 4:26 PM
In most of your posts, youHey Daniel,
In most of your posts, you are precise, if nothing else, and in this case, you are both accurate and precise.
Let me avoid contradictions and divergence by focusing on your last question, which attacks Parfit's project of future selves.
I read over a few chapters last night to ensure I understood, and even summarized them here, only to confuse myself.
Let me instead answer summarily, and maybe get at it in a few attempts.
Derek Parfit defines future selves as a continuation of the same psychological person that exists in the present. In his view, personal identity is not fixed but constantly changing and evolving as we undergo psychological experiences and changes.
The future self is not a separate entity but an extension of our current psychological selves. We can point to no fixed or independent entity and say, "this is the future self." This differs from his concept of our past selves. Both past and future selves over a spectrum of change can be more or less identified.
Parfit's view of personal identity is based on psychological continuity and connectedness rather than the continued existence of a particular substance, body or soul. Though the changes of the body can be correlated to different selves, the differences also can be strictly reserved to the mind.
If that is unhelpful, let me refine that. But I have already gone through too many revisions here to add more. I'm honestly struggling with it myself, as I have realized writing this and re-writing.
Sometimes I think I have something, only to write it down and realize... meh... not so much.
Best to you,
Tim
Daniel
Sunday, March 5, 2023 -- 4:58 PM
A plausible reading of yourA plausible reading of your answer could then read: If it fails, then it's you. Is that right? Future selves exist only in their denial of the present one. Your answer to my mind is interesting on account of your preclusion of an identical reference for the diverse uses of reflexives. Any event of a person's saying "I", for example, can not be referring to the same thing in any other such event, which raises then the question of whether any cases exist where identical reference of diverse reflexives can be true. I read your answer as given in the affirmative where the reflexive reference plays no determinative role, but is rather a product of what is determined by a psychological phenomenon which is referred to non-reflexively. In the example you've provided, perception of failure presupposes understanding of a prior goal, the assumption of identity for which can be described as a variant epiphenomenon upon occasion of co-duration of inter-psychological events, as here between anticipation and dismay. So where does that leave group identity, or the "we"? How might a collective concept of self-hood or identity escape ontological subordination to a psychologic determinism?
I take the argument, purporting to show that selfhood doesn't need identity, but rather just a series of psychological facts, to be something like this: Two events are described as (x): person x has something to say, and (x'): person x has nothing to say. Because the two can not coexist simultaneously, the events are redescribed as x at time t speaks (= x), and x at time t' is silent (= x'). The question then becomes whether x = x'. So if x = x' then x = y. And if x does not = x' then x = z. If x = x, then, y = z. But that can not be the case, since x and x' describe two different events. Therefore selfhood can not derive from any relation of identity, but rather from a proximal accident of paratactical facts described as psychological, which could in principle exist on their own without an identity-claim of any "who" which they belong to. This points to a non-individual claim in phenomena of psychological cohesion, an apt candidate for which would be some collectivity-presupposition, e.g. a culture, nation, community, people, etc. Evidence for this might be found in the fact that two people can have the same memory, or that the experience of one can be remembered by another, e.g. where a vivid description is made to someone who remembers it as her/his own while the one who describes it forgets it altogether. What might some alternate readings of your example consist of?
Tim Smith
Monday, March 6, 2023 -- 7:22 AM
Daniel,Daniel,
The philosophical use of abstraction here does not match the common usage? Can I bother you to define your usage?
I did not think much of Parfit's concept of future self prior to these past weeks, and now I am finding it quite profound.
Parfit might argue that while selfhood can exist without a fixed personal identity, psychological continuity and connectedness are crucial for determining personal identity and the existence of future selves.
I see no argument for abstracting identity from collective consciousness here. I am returning to Parfit's original paper.
There is much more to Parfit than I originally thought. I'm finding it very much in line with scientific views.
I'm not sure that helps. I am spending more time reading at this point than thinking or writing.
Take care,
Tim
Daniel
Tuesday, March 7, 2023 -- 9:37 AM
To where do you suggest ITo where do you suggest I take it, to the abstract individual as self-maximizer independent from collective contexts, or to the concrete group commitments for harm-minimization arising from one's complex experience prior to formation of one's deliberately conceived individual characteristics? Should I take the care to myself in the context of state-capitalist institutions, or to the group considered as a collective subject of socialist design? Because your imperative of care-seizure is left unspecified in this respect, it can not be acted upon until the respective details are provided.
"Abstraction" refers to the removal of a shared property from two or more objects to generate a new object which does not belong to them. Whether or not such objects exist in reality or constitute a mere linguistic convention remains unsettled. I interpret your above question on the matter to refer to the question about the suggestion that self-identity of individuals can be seen as an abstraction from collective contexts. This is achieved by placing priority on group-recognition prior to the development of special characteristics which distinguish its members from one another. But there is another use to which the operation can be put which is more germane, to use your appropriateness-indicator, in the question of whether or not individual identity constitutes an unwarranted generalization from a bundle of psychological facts which are held together by accidentally overlapping sections, each connected with the other by topical relationships which are not related to the larger group of facts arbitrarily brought under an imposed concept of identity not justified by its presumed components. Self-identity by this is therefore an abstraction from connections of psychological facts. But as I understand it the Parfitian's problem is not with the self, i.e. spontaneous internal cohesion of psychological facts, but its connection to the notion of identity.
So take a person who undergoes a great trauma, and proceeds to move past it to continue with her/his life. At times the person is unable to forget about it, and continues to mentally relive it. But at other times it is forgotten about, and unless someone reminds her/him of it, it's almost as if it never happened. Applying the symbols P for "can't forget" and Q for "has forgotten", t for time of psychological fact-occurrence, and x for the person in the process of recovery, the following equation can be made:
x is P at t or Q at t'.
x is Q at t or P at t'.
If P at t then Q at t', (= x').
If Q at t then P at t', (= x'').
x as a self contains P and Q in all applications to t and t', but x can not contain both x' and x'', and therefore can not be identical with itself, but is describable rather as an accident occurring upon mental events of a special variety, which indicates that identity as applied to a self is an unreal fantasy. The next move is then to ask if such a notion has any reality anywhere, which leads to the notion of assumed group identity, not as abstracted from the individuals which belong to it, but as a necessary condition of any subsequent application to individuals of conventional abstract identity.
How might this be related to Parfit's opposition to utilitarian models of social organization? Does the loss of self-identity for individuals preclude happiness-distribution for populations?
Tim Smith
Tuesday, March 7, 2023 -- 9:46 PM
Culture is not Parfit'sDaniel,
Culture is not Parfit's shtick perhaps; though he talks about the impact of culture on Personal Identity, he is more interested in Identity as it changes over time. Parfit does acknowledge the influence of social and cultural factors on Personal Identity. For example, in discussing the concept of survival, he notes that our views on what it means to survive over time may be influenced by cultural or social factors, such as religious beliefs about the afterlife or the importance of maintaining continuity with one's family or community. Additionally, Parfit discusses the idea of "psychological connectedness" as a critical aspect of Personal Identity and acknowledges that social and cultural factors may influence this connectedness. For example, he notes that some cultures may emphasize maintaining a continuous and stable self over time, while others may view the self as more fluid and malleable. So let's hold to that unless we have more to say. The impact of culture on Identity is real; he would have agreed and possibly even modified his thought given recent learnings. I will read his 'On What Matters,' as this episode has me intrigued, but it looks like that is a two-year project at best, and a likely decade long doorstop, followed by a yard sale oddity – it is truly massive.
Your definition of abstraction works with the question, and the modified version to 'Are individual interests and behaviors abstractions of one's past and future selves?' given the discussion.
Parfit might argue that using symbolic equations to represent Personal Identity is overly simplistic and fails to capture the issue's complexity. Additionally, Parfit would, on a metaphysical basis, take issue with a top-down view of Identity coming from groups, but that all would come with qualifications for sure. I would that he was alive today. This view of symbolic reasoning toward Identity is not shared by other philosophers (all of this comes with the AFAIK disclaimer), but this is clear from his books – Parfit supports the idea that philosophy can drive Identity when taken to heart. From this, we can take hope and the imperative to evaluate his arguments for their accuracy.
Parfit was critical of utilitarian models of social organization, which often prioritize maximizing aggregate happiness or well-being over the rights or interests of individual persons. He argued that this approach needs to take the reality of Personal Identity and the importance of individual rights and interests seriously.
Regarding whether the loss of self-identity for individuals precludes happiness distribution for populations, Parfit would argue that it is possible to promote the well-being of populations without sacrificing individual rights or interests. He would also likely say that a more nuanced and complex approach to social organization is needed, one that considers the reality of Personal Identity and the diversity of individual interests and values. From this perspective, promoting happiness or well-being for populations should be pursued in a way that respects the rights and interests of individuals rather than treating them as a mere means to an end – with all apologies to the people in the trenches of the Ukraine.
As to what I think, I'm moved to take a larger view toward the role of culture and technology in forming and changing our concepts of Personal Identity, given the polarization of our country. But I am more interested in staying within the scientific view of the embodied brain. Much of that science has evolved since Parfit's early work, but he toes the line in this regard given the state of science – when 'Reasons and Persons' and his first paper, ' Personal Identity,' were written.
Thanks for this comment. I'm still trying to get at Parfit's definition of a future self; I still remember I owe that to this discussion. The density and style of the book 'Reasons and Person' is a concatenated series of arguments instead of a flowing narrative. Depending on his focus, some of these ideas come out in arguments and not necessarily the later ones.
Parfit is more than a match for any philosopher I have read, and I deeply regret not taking him more seriously earlier in my life. It might have changed some choices for me.
Best,
Tim
Daniel
Wednesday, March 8, 2023 -- 2:59 PM
So your present self is notSo your present self is not the future self of your past one, but might have a future self of its own? How do you know? Your statement above seems to suggest that one's choices make the difference but provides no information about what kinds of choices those might be. One can presume however a basic distinction between good ones and bad ones. The good choices keep the future self around until it turns into the present one, but bad choices make the future self run away so that the present one can never catch up with it. Well then, doesn't that mean that everybody else's future selves constitute the only force that can make yours stay put, and any choice which takes only your own into account can never find it? But that would seem to indicate that you never had one in the first place, and only by assuming everybody else's does your own become something one could ever be. Would your Parfit buy such an argument? What if it came at a discount, and one only had to assume a few other future selves instead of all of them?
Tim Smith
Wednesday, March 8, 2023 -- 10:16 PM
The idea that your presentThe idea that your present self is not a future self of your past self is counterintuitive, mind-blowing, and likely accurate and aligned with Parfit's thought. Personal Identity is different from what I thought it was if I take Parfit's thesis to heart, which I am considering now as I think about his arguments. As I do this, I am gifted the weight of moral obligations we have to our future selves, deep learnings from the ones that preceded us, and respect for my present contemporaries.
We may gain knowledge and understanding and make good or bad choices from this. In either path, our future selves take wing in the constantly changing relation of our mental states. We can add or subtract or make new states by changing our thought, body, and world with respect to the idea that our Personal Identity is a relation of states and not a permanent or static edifice.
If Personal Identity is genuinely an ever-changing relation of mental states, then it would be sad not to embrace the projects that appreciate this change and the prudent stewardship this view entrusts in our decisions. The ramifications are enormous. Had I understood this, and it's obvious I don't quite as yet understand, self-centered choices would not have been an option. Several relationships, jobs, and adventures may have gone differently. Considering this difference is the challenge of accepting Parfit's idea of Personal Identity, even in part.
Daniel
Friday, March 10, 2023 -- 4:43 PM
OK, so one's duties areOK, so one's duties are defined by the fact that any future self will be among many others which are also now present (first paragraph above). What distinguishes them as duty-definers (or producers) is that they can change in ways that present and past selves can't (second paragraph). And this means in turn that present selves, defined by their duties to the future ones, can have no self identity on account of the fact that their future selves can't either, making the past ones the only self identical ones which one usually doesn't want to be on account of better alternates which weren't taken (third paragraph). What am I missing in this summary?
Tim Smith
Sunday, March 12, 2023 -- 9:09 PM
OK, just saw this. Let's tryOK, just saw this. Let's try and keep this to one thread if possible, in the interest of time.
Duty is another matter and is contingent on everything else being equal. Yes, the future self will be among many. What distinguishes them is their unique relation of psychological states, a uniqueness shared with present and past selves and not identical. I don't get the not having identities claim, and past selves are not 'identical' in quality or number to anything. I don't see it in my post; identicality is another essential matter. Why are you bringing that up here?
I've already put a bit of effort into rewriting my previous posts below, I just saw this, and I'm going to admit - I need some clarification. If I can clarify further, I will. Your summary is unfair, and I don't want you to think I'm not reading. I am.
Daniel
Friday, March 17, 2023 -- 4:12 PM
You are reading at theYou are reading at the present moment, but it's a different one from the others which are referred to above. Your wish that the reader hold one particular opinion about your reading habits rather than another is attributable to a specific group of psychological states, according to your Parfitian, which are taken as a single individual. But because this group resembles but is slightly different from the current group you take as your own, they can not be identical with each other. And because this claimed identity constitutes the ground of one's self-hood claim, one can not be identical with one's self. Therefore although you are reading, you have not been reading. Is this correct?
Tim Smith
Saturday, March 18, 2023 -- 4:08 PM
Hi Daniel,Hi Daniel,
Thank you for your thoughts here. The concepts we're discussing can be complex, and it's easy for misunderstandings to arise. Reading the little I can of Edmonds's book (a preview is available on Google Books), many famous minds need help to come to grips with his detailed arguments. I, too, am having issues tying them together. Let me address your concerns and provide some clarification.
First, regarding personal identity, the idea I present, as does Parfit, is that our identity is not a static or fixed entity but a fluid and dynamic relationship between ever-changing mental states. These psychological continuities connect our past, present, and future selves. It's important to note that this doesn't mean we lack self-identity; instead, it highlights a deeper and more scientific model of selfhood that evolves.
As for the concept of duties, the focus should not be on the duties "defining" our present selves but on our responsibilities towards our future selves and others, given this fluid notion of personal identity. Recognizing that our identity is not static can lead to increased awareness of the potential consequences of our actions and a greater sense of responsibility for our future selves, our own, and others. Interestingly this also lessens our duties for our past selves and acts, though there are other foci here.
Concerning your conclusion that one cannot be identical to oneself due to changing psychological states, it's essential to differentiate between strict identity and the continuity of mental states that connects our past, present, and future selves. Our selfhood persists over time through the interconnectedness and evolution of our psychological states, even though they are not strictly identical.
Please ask further questions or, better yet, share your thoughts without prejudice from mine, as engaging in this dialogue can help us understand what is difficult reading, no matter where you find yourself in his work. Let's stick to Parfit's idea of future selves, though, if possible.
Best,
Tim
Tim Smith
Wednesday, March 1, 2023 -- 10:38 AM
Harold,Harold,
Thanks for this question and your range of thought, and I hope you are doing well. You seem to be thinking crisply. You and I will probably agree that ethics, as an issue, are alive and well, even as morality may be questionably dead to very live and cogent philosophers.
Parfit holds moral language and concepts as vital in making ethical decisions. I agree with him there, and even if my thinking may not be so crisp, I defend that here. One can hardly form public or personal policy on issues touching on social justice without liberal use of moral lingo, if not sentiment. To do less is to relegate ethics to the shallows. No 'person' would do this.
So... no... morality is not a dead issue, and more on point, long live Derek Parfit's philosophical views!
Your question is concise and pointed but not straightforward enough not to unleash the Kraken into a more rarefied space. I do appreciate your question, though, and its root concern.
Best to you wherever you think,
Tim
Tim Smith
Thursday, March 9, 2023 -- 7:04 AM
Parfit is concerned that ourParfit is concerned that our Identity is transient and not necessarily connected to our past selves. Putting a unique value on survival puts value on our ego, which is fleeting and illusory even to our own future selves if we take his idea of Identity to heart in the present. Parfit places our values on solid ground by indulging in this humble pie. To fight for survival without first walking this ground is a moral challenge when other projects may align with our values.
The transformation Parfit made in his later life, and here I can only read the snippets that Google books allow of Edmonds' book, is an allegory of indulgence in Parfit's philosophy. Derek was engaged in his public work and, in the few anecdotes and vignettes Edmonds relates in his book, was an excellent present self to his contemporaries. Parfit's commitment to his work in his later years moves my thought about my own future self, and I would take his dedication as an answer to how we should treat our future identities.
To value others in the way that I value myself is a project in which I don't want to partake. Now that I have read this and continue to read him, I don't have a choice. Having taken in Sapolsky's 'Behave' 'choice' is not really in my deck, which is the fitting metaphor for Derek's model of current selves – we have a deck of neuronal clusters and connections that are constantly changing and interacting with other 'cards' and creating new ones. What value people may have is likely captured in Iain Banks's concept of the 'The Culture,' and his book 'Consider Phlebas' comes to mind as I consider valuing others as I do myself. Isn't this the do unto others idea at its core?
The surest way to harness Parfit's insights is first to realize these insights are not Derek's. He was preceded by Sydney Shoemaker, who was preceded by Hume's idea that we are "bundles of perceptions." We need to be humble and cognizant of our place in time. Finally, to this question, we need to be kind to others and, as best we can, to ourselves.
If any of this seems simple, it is not so when you make these statements without relying on a book or religious tenet. Parfit has laid out a series of arguments that puts the golden rule on terra firma.
Daniel
Thursday, March 9, 2023 -- 3:14 PM
Treat others as you'd treatTreat others as you'd treat yourself? What if you're a masochist? Although you've made no arguments above and have given no reasons for your opinions, you nevertheless bring up an interesting comparison in the second to last paragraph between overlap of psychological facts elucidated by the Parfitian and Hume's famous characterization of internal self consciousness as a "bundle of perceptions". For Hume the perceptions come first, not what bundles them together, referred to by the perceiver as "I". That is certainly compatible with the notion of duration of individual self identity over time as a by-product of overlapping occurrences described as psychological, and for which therefore no exclusive right of ownership or belonging can be admitted. Where one projects this pseudo-identity into the future, by imagination or thoughtless assumption, this can not then refer to anything real that could ever exist. But it would also be a mistake to say that the identity by-product in the present isn't real, only that it doesn't belong to the individual who claims it. That's where the notion of collective self consciousness comes in. Is the self-conscious individual then just a hypostatization of the collective one?
Tim Smith
Friday, March 10, 2023 -- 10:50 AM
Daniel,Daniel,
You are correct. I only have a few arguments in the post above. Instead, I aim to write my impressions of the prompts to the show, which I listed above but will do again here to explain my intent.
1. Why does Derek Parfit argue that it's wrong to place a special value on your own survival?
2. Should you treat your future self any differently than other future people?
3. What would it take to value others in the way that you value yourself?
4. How might we harness Parfit's insights to make the world a better place?
Unlike you and I, most people don't read/write these comments to clarify their thought. My post above fairly and succinctly stated my impressions, hoping it might encourage other participants to do the same. But… crickets so far. So be it.
I have already addressed the collective self-consciousness concern in your reply to Harold and our back-and-forth. There I mentioned that Parfit discusses social concerns regarding survival, religion, cultural norms, and maintaining continuity with family and community. But let's go deeper if possible.
You have responded with a call for arguments. That is a bullet for Derek Parfit, for the most part. I made some, and they could be more concise by design. There are subtle perspectives to consider, and let's do that as well.
If you want arguments, let's have at Parfit's 'Reasons and Persons' (R&P), for it is his masterwork. It contains 164 claims, many written in a deductive style. I can list them here, and we can go through them individually if you have patience. Not only that, Parfit has done us the favor of picking apart each of his more famous critics in his most recent 3 volume, 'On What Matters,' which is filled with yet more arguments and counter-arguments.
I have just read R&P – let me stick to that; though I am hardly an expert, I learn by going back through and thinking about this. What I do have, however, is a change of mind, which is a potent tool not unlike a beginner's mind. Still, I have some reservations regarding embodiment with Parfit, but I find his arguments both informative and formative to my moral center. Maybe that will be enough to take this interlocution somewhere useful, even if only to serve a softball to Josh and Ray in their discussion with David (assuming it hasn't already happened.) Ok… let's discuss your concerns.
When I mentioned the golden rule, please take that into context. I have warped it to Parfit's thesis that past and future selves can often and ought to be treated as separate people in the extreme, at the very least. A more accurate formulation of the golden rule would be to treat others as we want to be treated, assuming that their preferences align with basic moral principles such as avoiding harm and promoting well-being. The Christian formulation, in red letter type, is "So in everything, do to others what you would have them do to you, for this sums up the Law and the Prophets." Matthew 7:12. I cite the Bible because this is the project that Parfit is engaged in, setting our Moral standing on firm ground without reference to religion – NTTAWWT. "WWJD" is as alive a question today and more pertinent than any ethical treatise. But Parfit was concerned with the growing skepticism, moral nihilism, and decline of religion in our time. He wanted to derive our ethical sensibility, not the least of which is the golden rule, from reasons. He doesn’t mention the golden rule in his work, but it is a sentiment in his proposed treatment of future selves. Arguably, Parfit does set normative reasoning for morality, however, without referring to sky hooks.
I agree, for the most part, with your focus on Hume and would comment that Parfit builds on Hume's insights by showing how our sense of self is shaped by psychological continuity and connectedness over time. This helps to explain why we may have a strong attachment to our future selves, even though they will not necessarily be identical to our current selves, and not so in the extremes, or what Shoemaker terms the much later selves with respect to the future.
Finally, as to your focus on collective self-consciousness, I get it. So would have Parfit, but that is not his focus, and I will argue neither is yours.
I have already mentioned some tangential references Derek makes in R&P above and previously. Parfit's views suggest that identity is more fluid and interconnected than traditionally thought, emphasizing the role of social relationships and shared experiences in shaping our sense of self. This perspective challenges traditional notions of individualism and emphasizes the importance of empathy and compassion towards others, as we are all part of a more extensive network of social and psychological connections. I would challenge any Parfitian scholar who questions this idea, but I wouldn't be able to cite a specific passage to support my argument. Derek Parfit was not blind to collective interests outside the body influencing our decisions – it just isn't his focus.
If we want to talk about collective self-consciousness, we can go to plenty of other philosophers to do that; Heidegger is the poster child (and look where that led him,) and he also talks deeply about technology – which gives me more pause than any other collective foundation to identity; Michel Foucault is the best example perhaps to speak to your concern; Friedrich Nietzsche precedes Heidegger, and arguably got him into his troubles, but speaks to culture even as he lauded Super-people who could create their limitations; and finally Cornel West, who talks about race, class, and gender. The list of other philosophers to discuss this idea is seemingly endless, and yet Derek Parfit doesn't make that cut. Yes, culture exists and evolves through social change, which affects individuals' personal identities. Still, it is only one of many drivers in personal identity and not the prime one, at least not in Parfit's projects or view. It's not in mine if I am being true to my sensibility.
Do you attribute your character and identity to a collective? I've attended schools, worked for companies, pledged allegiance to our flag, and sworn testimony on the Bible. I do not look to any of these collective repositories to explain my ticks and ideations. I am a person separate from others first and foremost. I've read your stuff here. You do not take notes from others in your words. Do you feel you are a product of a collective? Say you are in one way or another, and yet do you feel like others determine your identity? I don't think you do. That may be a privilege on our part and an assumption on mine, but it is also a feeling of empowerment. When I wear my school colors, I don't become anyone but myself – with some exceptions to stadium wave behavior. Let's be clear. Do you attribute your core identity to a collective or abstract one? If someone states a syllogism, do you refer to a collective to determine its validity? Yes or no?
You have your values, which may or may not align with the values Parfit is trying to normatively reason out of Personal Identity as a relation of psychological states. Regardless of how you answer here, there is worth to this project and reward in understanding his arguments, which brings us to his arguments.
I can list the arguments here, summarize them, and we can parse them. But I can't offer ideas that he is not making, and I have yet to read 'On What Matters.' I could also look through that now, but I would be hunting and pecking.
Andy Clark is going to do a PT show for his new book. He is as sharp as they come regarding technology; we can also revisit that there.
Best,
Tim
Daniel
Friday, March 10, 2023 -- 11:48 AM
The notion of collective selfThe notion of collective self-consciousness is offered as a way out of the basic contradiction in an individual one, namely, that it can't be identical with itself. The list of philosophers which you say dealt with the issue makes no sense to me and provides no clue to the reasons for your choices. But consider this argument:
1) Person x can perform action A or action B at time t, but not both.
2) Because performance of one action must exclude the possibility of performance of the other, the original set of both defines the limits of one's sense and presupposition of the existence of one's self.
3) If action A is performed, person x becomes person x', and
4) if action B is performed, person x becomes person x''.
5) Because x' therefore is not identical to x'', x can not be identical to itself.
Now contrast this with another:
Two people are stuck in the same room. Person x tries to leave by a window, but it's too small. Person y tries to leave by a door, but it won't open. Both people are now different than they were before they tried to leave the room, but are still stuck in it. Therefore, their identity with one another is preserved precisely on the basis of what makes them not identical with themselves.
Does this argument work for your Parfitian? I would contend that it's consistent with the claim that preoccupation with one's individual survival is unethical, as the design of the action is to free both from the room, not just one which leaves the other behind.
Tim Smith
Saturday, March 11, 2023 -- 12:11 PM
Hey Daniel,Hey Daniel,
Michel Foucault and Simone de Beauvoir are your thinkers to let these two people out of their room. If that needs to be clarified, let me briefly go into that before returning to Parfit to answer your two scenarios and get closer to his ideas and our topic.
"Power" was Foucault's main focus, while de Beauvoir focuses on "The Other" to get at gender inequality. Both, and Sartre, for that matter, use collective self-consciousness to give action to their concerns. Michel speaks long and hard to contingency as a shaper of race, gender, and sexuality and determinant of Personal Identity (PI.) Simone writes about the dynamic subject-object relationship and the power of interaction to form our self through a rising collective self-consciousness.
As to Parfit and your many worlds and no-exit/escape room scenarios, yes, these add insight and spark a response from Parfitlandia.
Parfit's argument is normative, pointy, and hard to swallow. He is concerned with what we ought to do, not what we have done and how we have done it. Normativity is why he writes about our future selves much more than our past and also why he germinates on the idea of Personal Identity. Derek asks us to reconsider ourselves, not as a concatenated mind and body through time and space, but as a relation of psychological states that continue or connect. By focusing on psychological continuity and connectedness rather than our momentary Personal Identity, we can better understand what it means to live a moral life and how we can strive to live up to our moral ideals.
What Parfit means by continuity and connectedness over time is more pertinent than Personal Identity and whether it remains the same. At any one time, we are the relation R of whatever states we may possess. Some conditions may come, go, evolve, or dissolve from moment to moment. The fact that they persist in the short term can be dislodged in the moment, or that R could become R' in the much later self is not as important as considering that R and R' are connected and continuous despite their difference.
While reading 'Reasons and Persons,' I couldn't help but think of the Tines from Vernor Vinge's 'A Fire Upon the Deep,' which might be a good read and approach to Parfit's idea of connected and continuous Personal Identity. It is unrelated but explains the concept of relation and psychological states as they compose PI.
In your many worlds scenario, the choice of person x is a contingency of R. I doubt that choice is genuine, but Parfit doesn't. He is very much involved in your scenario and would imbue meaning more or less on the nature of the actions and their effect on the relation of psychological states in person x. In reality, most activities are inconsequential, but they could reflect a tipping point or a trauma that would drastically change one's conditions or alter the relation of persisting states.
Regarding the no exit/escape room scenario, as we have discussed above and in your response to Harold, Parfit understands the effect of environment and real-world problems on Personal Identity but is primarily focused on the desires and goals of individuals. The actions they take are less important than their shared experience. But that could be very different, depending on their desire to leave or their goal to get along. In your escape room, you have spoken for these goals and desires, and that is something Parfit would not take lightly or assume. It taints the power of the example, but yes, environment and shared experience matter to PI.
Much of this we have discussed previously, and ideas that I suggest are not. We both should focus on Parfits' points and not our own, as we can only change our Rs by stepping into the arguments of others. If we need to incorporate connected self-consciousness into our models for PI, and we don't for Parfit's purpose, we would be better suited to use the arguments of other philosophers. But these concerns are real.
Best,
Tim
Daniel
Sunday, March 12, 2023 -- 1:56 PM
So if someone doesn't like aSo if someone doesn't like a particular argument, say Descartes' Cogito, and thinks she/he's got a better one, say, getting rid of the "ergo sum", that they should nevertheless deploy Descartes' argument anyway just because it's attributed to someone else? Your admonition to "use" the arguments of others is strange, since it is presumed that they would first have to be understood and therefore accepted or rejected. And the claim that one's own arguments, namely, those that one can defend, are insufficient for altering the relation between diverse psychological components for particular experience is untenable. The reaching of a novel conclusion by one's own efforts alone is sufficient to refute this claim, as the psychological component which its discovery constitutes generates a new relation to all the others.
Also, perhaps I haven't expressed the arguments for selfhood in common as remedy for abolition of private selfhood clearly. The first is not a many-worlds argument, and the second is only derivatively a no exit one. They can be restated as:
1) If Jane marries John she will become Mrs. John, which is not identical with Miss Jane, and therefore not identical with herself.
2) If Jane and John take a walk in the woods and get lost, and John climbs a hill to survey the area while Jane checks a map for information on their location, each are in effect a different person or "self" then they were before they took action. In addition to being different from themselves, they've also become different from one another. They continue to share however in the same circumstance of being lost, --and it's this circumstance which defines them to themselves more than the independent selves they have become. Therefore what makes them different from themselves causes them to be the same as each other, indicating that collective selfhood exists insofar as individual selfhood is denied.
How might this be related to the issue you bring up in the fourth and fifth paragraphs above where a central concern of the Parfitian is described as the relation between various facts of one's psychological constituency at a given time (independent of its cause, cf. p. 287) rather than the duration any of the component parts? Does it matter to whom these facts belong?
Tim Smith
Monday, March 13, 2023 -- 5:40 AM
Hey Daniel,Hey Daniel,
Quick get back here, as I didn't get to this note before.
Our arguments and views are insufficient for altering the relationship between diverse psychological components involving personal identity (PI), which means social and collective ideas are needed. But at any one time, individuals are free to use rational arguments and empirical evidence to determine truth, even if it is only to their own view.
Again, collective selfhood is a myth, even to the most devout Marine. When a US Marine, for example, uses the term 'Semper Fi,' makes decisions premised on that idea and draws identity from his uniform and oath, they make personal choices. Individual and collective selfhood are not mutually exclusive; both are essential components of personal identity at any time. But the relative states are complex and identifiable only by their continuity and connection to past selves.
In the extremes of life, babyhood, and old age, these relations are heavily leveraged first for social and lastly for the individual. There are many exceptions to this last rule as the mind deteriorates, and many states lose all facilities compromising personal identity in favor of whatever social selfhood is dominant in an individual's community or history. Similarly, young adults can be precocious, and there are many unfortunate and interesting examples of both. For the purposes of Parfit's discussions, these extremes are not considered and should be.
There are consequences to Parfit's conception of persons. One is thought to our future selves, and another is the empowerment of young minds, who have a disproportionate amount of personal future selves to think about and a more significant stake in the world. But the most important of these are the foundations of ethical insight as it applies to generational identity, which is captured in units of personal identity. What individuals ought to do.
Without speaking directly to your examples but about them, Parfit holds that personal identity is not dependent on any specific substance or entity and that PI is a matter of psychological continuity and connectedness. It does not matter to whom these facts 'belong' if they are relevant to the relations of states in any one person's identity.
I apologize if this doesn't directly address your examples. I'm giving feedback here. You currently have four threads going, and I can only offer small input for the moment. But I'm interested.
Best,
Tim
Daniel
Friday, March 17, 2023 -- 3:34 PM
An expression of interest isAn expression of interest is an observable indication of eagerness, which can be described as a mental or psychological state. The domain of possible psychological objects can in turn be understood as effects of causes which are not psychological and belong to another domain, such matter, biology, et al. In understanding interest as eagerness however, as I interpret your final sentence above, no indication is given of its formal contents. I also happen to be interested, and therefore could be correctly described as co-eager, even if the contents and therefore the non-material reasons which explain this interest might be very different. If the formal reasons are different but the material causes are the same, how is one still talking about the same person? Isn't there now two people: an effect of a cause and a cause of an effect? If so, there can be only one which is eager, since any material explanation seeks the minimum number of causal factors, but there could be a great many interested ones, because the sole explanatory element would have to be found in diverse individual content-explanations. You've given no such explanation here. The reader is therefore here compelled to interpret your statement as one of co-eagerness, and as such is unrelated to the topic. How might it be translated as one of content-interest? What about what you're calling "generational identity"? Could this refer to manner of dress?
Tim Smith
Saturday, March 18, 2023 -- 4:13 PM
See my response below ==>See my response below
==> https://www.philosophytalk.org/comment/reply/7209/8544 as this seems to be a precursor to that and connected.
Tim Smith
Wednesday, April 12, 2023 -- 9:39 AM
I have just listened to theI have just listened to the show, and read back through the comments here. I see that I have said "connected" when I meant "collective" above. If anyone reads through my previous post, you and I are on a very lonely planet. The last paragraph should read...
Much of this we have discussed previously, and ideas that I suggest are not. We both should focus on Parfits' points and not our own, as we can only change our Rs by stepping into the arguments of others. If we need to incorporate "collective" self-consciousness into our models for PI, and we don't for Parfit's purpose, we would be better suited to use the arguments of other philosophers. But these concerns are real.
With my edit in quotes. I get confused often to be honest, and this is a worthwhile correction to be dishonest.
Joy
Daniel
Thursday, April 20, 2023 -- 2:14 PM
--Relative to the agent but--Relative to the agent but temporally neutral, I presume. The pain of your error is temporally neutral, as it's expressed above, because it is no less painful on account of its cause being in the past and unable to be repeated. But its cause is not agent-neutral in the sense that it can't be ascribed to anyone else, and it seems senseless to say that someone else feels the pain of another's error, even if someone sympathetic can in some sense feel the pain of another's pain. So if the cause of your pain ties an agent-relativity to a temporal neutrality of its effect, what makes the jump? Is it the body that feels it, or the desire which caused it?
Daniel
Friday, March 10, 2023 -- 11:07 AM
To go over this post in aTo go over this post in a little more detail, it might be of some value to number the commentary by paragraph order:
1) Participant Smith's Parfitian states that if I want to live for my own sake into the next moment then I'm too arrogant. The realization of this fact is caused by taking said "idea of identity [= there is none] to heart [= seriously]". The author then wonders how that can coincide with one's other projects which require continued survival of the individual.
2) If the self however can be considered only in the aspect of its presence, then the philosopher who came up with the idea of selflessness contradicted himself by being a pretty good self, presumably meaning that he was a "solid guy" who could be relied upon and trusted, so that in living up to the promise shown in his past present self an exemplary model is provided for the author about how to be nice to your future self which, of course, can't be identical with itself once it becomes a present self.
3) The third paragraph undertakes a discussion of golden rule-ism, which the author rejects on the basis of the Cartesian simple "what's done cannot be undone". Using her/himself as an example, application of the rule is simply impossible.
4) In the fourth paragraph a remedy for the situation described in (3) is offered: Instead of doing unto others as one would do to one's self, it might be possible to do unto one's self as one would do to others. The implies of course that one tends to treat others better than one's self, but no claim is made by the author that that's the case.
5) The fifth paragraph contains the author's certificate of authenticity, stating that it's not so easy to speak for yourself without repeating someone else's opinions.
Does the author consider this summation accurate? Gifted would her/his readers be should that information be provided.
Tim Smith
Friday, March 10, 2023 -- 11:20 AM
I don't think this is fair orI don't think this is fair or right, but let's stick to my response above. You probably didn't see it prior to posting this.
Daniel
Friday, March 10, 2023 -- 11:50 AM
Correct.Correct.
Daniel
Saturday, March 11, 2023 -- 1:09 PM
A request is here submittedA request is here submitted to participant Smith to rewrite the post of 3/10/23 10:50 am so that the meaning it conveys is preserved in a more concise form, both in order to reduce the bulk of forum contents in the service of better reader's access, and for my own benefit regarding research into the topic. Its meaning-summary is divided below by numbering the paragraphs:
(1) and (2) state the authors intent and restate the questions from the topic description, but do not make clear their relation to what follows.
(3) Here the author states that she/he has written clearly on the topic previously, but received no relevant response.
(4) A further claim is made of relevant prior elucidation, and additional discussion is suggested.
(5) Responding to inquiry into supportive argument, the author claims she/he has already performed this task, and has the ability to do it again.
(6) In addition to the author's own arguments, which remain undetected, she/he recommends those which can be found in the topic-philosopher's work.
(7) Here the author claims that she/he has read one of the books written by this philosopher, and indicates that she/he has thought about it, and might be willing to discuss it.
(8) Paragraph eight contains a discussion of Golden-Rule-ism and states that while it does not appear in the topic-philosopher's work, she/he has tried to adapt it to it, but withholds her/his reasons for this. The claim is then made that the philosopher wants to find a reason for this and other moralistic platitudes, because traditional morality is seen as in decline.
(9) The Hume-connection is cited as a plausible source for an explanation of why people assume they will have a future self even if it's a little different than the present one, but doesn't provide a clue as to why.
(10) Here the author mentions the former discussion of collective self consciousness, and says she/he doesn't want to talk about it.
(11) Here the author states that the philosopher's views take into account social contributions to individual experiences, and therefore can take account of collective interests without having to focus specifically upon them.
(12) For discussions of collective self-consciousness a list of philosophers is provided without stated grounds.
(13) The question is asked whether belonging to a group is a necessary condition for individual self-recognition, or whether individual self-recognition is a necessary condition for self-consciously belonging to a group.
(14) This paragraph contains a program statement: 'Let's continue'.
(15) Here the statement is made that the author has the skill and ability to review the philosopher's arguments, but not her/his own.
(16) The last paragraph patronizes.
The two paragraphs which convey any information on the topic and ask a relevant question are (11) and (13). (11) contains the assertion that, because particular components of individual self-consciousness are socially conditioned in ways that the whole individual is not, study of these components equates to study of areas where the answer to questions about collective self-consciousness might be found. Paragraph (13) asks the relevant question of whether individual self-awareness could exist at all if it were not preceded not only by an abstract sense of belonging to a group, but by the conscious self-awareness of the group itself AS an individual, as it were. If your post is then rewritten in a more concise form including only or just slightly more contents than contained in these two very important paragraphs, I would be happy to answer them, as it is heartily agreed that there is worth in doing so.
Tim Smith
Sunday, March 12, 2023 -- 4:06 AM
A reply is made to Daniel.A reply is made to Daniel.
I will do this if you first reply to this post - word for word in quotation marks - with the last sentence of Sub-chapter 106 of Chapter 14 of Derek Parfit's 'Reasons and Persons.'
Daniel
Sunday, March 12, 2023 -- 11:04 AM
Sure. One detail of thisSure. One detail of this request however should be made clear to avoid any misunderstanding, --"rewrite" refers to the original post of 3/10/23 10:50 am by means of the edit-function, not an additional post. With regards to the quotation from chapter 14, the philosopher is making another point about how self-identity is a bad idea, as it could lead to neglect of one's self in the future, since everyone has the right to hurt themselves if they want, but can claim no such right with regards to others. The conclusory statement that "we should not do to our future selves what it would be wrong to do to other people" recommends that one ought to treat one's future self as though it were another person, thereby preventing self-harm in the long run. An obvious problem with this recommendation, i.e. that if one will later become someone else, then no responsibility for past action need be anticipated, seems not to affect the benefits of such a position if taken in isolation, and in fact equates to a rejection of social self-deprecation. The rewrite-request is made on the basis of what I consider to be an excess of non-topic related material, imposing greater difficulty for potential readers and risking an Admin. entry-block based on page-volume.
-Thanks.
Tim Smith
Sunday, March 12, 2023 -- 11:44 AM
Daniel,Daniel,
Paragraph (14) and the rest of the post doesn't contain "Let's Continue."? Am I missing something there?
I will get to this later this evening probably.
Tim
Daniel
Sunday, March 12, 2023 -- 12:24 PM
It contains your statementIt contains your statement that further discussion on the topic is worth pursuing, as I interpret it. I agree, but by that same token saying it is not doing it, and thereby falls within the category of unrelated material. I'm planning to reread Hayden White's "Metahistory", for example, but the statement of my intention has nothing to do with the text contents.
Tim Smith
Sunday, March 12, 2023 -- 8:32 PM
Daniel,Daniel,
I'm not able to edit that post as I lose my edit option 24 hrs (ish... I'm not sure exactly when?) after the final edit. I support that rule as re-writes are painful. I've been able cut more out though since so much has been said since then. I hope this works. I cut a ton. I'm really happy you have the textual resources in front of you and look forward to your insight.
Best,
Tim
Tim Smith
Monday, March 13, 2023 -- 5:58 AM
Daniel,Daniel,
I addressed the collective self-consciousness concern in our previous conversation with Harold. I mentioned that Parfit discussed social concerns related to survival, religion, cultural norms, and continuity with family and community. Let's delve further if we can.
You asked for arguments, which is mostly what Derek Parfit's work consists of. I provided some, which could be more concise. There are also subtle perspectives to consider, so let's explore those as well.
If you want arguments, I suggest we focus on ‘Reasons and Persons’ (R&P). It contains multiple claims, many written in a deductive style. We can go through them individually, and additionally we can look at 'On What Matters,' which is filled with yet more arguments and counter-arguments.
I recently read R&P myself, and although I'm not an expert, I find it helpful to revisit and contemplate the concepts presented. Despite some reservations I have regarding embodiment in Parfit's work, his arguments have been both informative and formative for my moral beliefs. Perhaps our discussion can lead to some useful insights, even if it only serves as a starting point for Josh and Ray's discussion with David (assuming it hasn't already taken place). Ok... your concerns.
When I mentioned the golden rule, it was in the context of Parfit's thesis that past and future selves should often be treated as separate people. While the golden rule is typically formulated as treating others as we want to be treated, assuming their preferences align with basic moral principles, Parfit's work aimed to establish a firm moral grounding without relying on religion. While he doesn't mention the golden rule explicitly, it is reflected in his proposed treatment of future selves. Parfit aimed to derive our ethical sensibility from reasons rather than religion, setting normative reasoning for morality without invoking "sky hooks." Although "WWJD" remains a relevant question, Parfit was concerned with the growing skepticism, moral nihilism, and decline of religion in our time.
I agree, for the most part, with your focus on Hume and would add that Parfit builds on Hume's insights by showing how our sense of self is shaped by psychological continuity and connectedness over time. This helps to explain why we may have a strong attachment to our future selves.
Finally, as to your focus on collective self-consciousness, I get it. So would have Parfit, but that is not his focus, and I will argue neither is yours.
Parfit's views suggest a fluid and interconnected understanding of identity, with social relationships and shared experiences playing a role, as I have already agreed, in shaping our sense of self. This challenges traditional notions of individualism and highlights the importance of empathy and compassion towards others as we are all part of a larger network of social and psychological connections. No Parfitian would question this, except to point out that Parfit’s focus is on the relation of psychological states that continues and connects, in varying degree over time.
Many philosophers have addressed collective self-consciousness, such as Heidegger, Foucault, Nietzsche, and West, among others. Personal Identity is personal not collective, not racial identity, not class, not religious, nor ideological identity. While collective factors can be one of many drivers in personal identity, Parfit's focus was primarily on the individual, their psychological continuity, and how this continuity affects their sense of self over time.
Do you attribute your identity to a collective or abstract entity? Despite attending schools, working for companies, and making various pledges, I do not look to these collective entities to explain my personal identity. I see myself as a separate individual. While you also appear to be an independent thinker, do you feel that others determine your identity? If someone states a syllogism, do you refer to a collective to focus on its validity?
You have your own values, which may or may not align with the values that Parfit seeks to derive through his project on Personal Identity as a relation of psychological states. However, there is value in understanding his arguments, and there are rewards to be gained from engaging with them.
Andy Clark is going to do a PT show for his new book. He is keen on technology; we can also revisit that aspect there, which I think is the most profound.
All that said, and re-written, let me just add that your are certainly entitled to your thesis, and own impressions. I apologize if I offended anyone here. I take exception to your commentary, and must say never meant to patronize anyone.
Funny side note. I’m sitting here watching the Academy Awards, only to have Daniel Kwan the co-director attribute all genius to the collective consciousness. So there you go Daniel.
Tim
Daniel
Wednesday, March 15, 2023 -- 5:48 PM
In terms of consciousIn terms of conscious awareness or common basis of application? The first takes genial works to have a collective author; the second a collective appreciator. Neither case puts selfhood together with consciousness, as with individual self-identity claims. In your eighth paragraph you suggest that empathy ought to override self interest as a safer bet, even when it is irrational, i.e. where neglect of self interest might harm the object of one's empathy, since the interest in inter-individual relations may require adopting particular socially conditioned roles one can take no responsibility for while nevertheless maintaining them for purposes of self-interested identity claims, which in turn furnish grounds for deliberate action. Is that correct? If so, is this the primary reason for collective-identity denial, --that it would have to be composed of categories of effects the deliberate causes for which no individual could claim responsibility? What's the relation between a supposed group of these irresponsible quasi-agents and the possibility of singular internal reflection?
The tenth paragraph asks whether others must be presupposed in any individual self-identity claims, but is deleted here in the interest of brevity and time restrictions.
Tim Smith
Wednesday, March 15, 2023 -- 7:20 PM
Daniel,Daniel,
You speak well on the relationship between selfhood, consciousness, and collective identity.
In the eighth paragraph, the focus was more on challenging traditional individualism and emphasizing the role of empathy and compassion in our moral framework rather than suggesting that empathy should override self-interest in every situation. Parfit's work on personal identity underlines the interconnectedness of individuals, which can inform our moral reasoning and actions.
In response to your question about the primary reason for collective-identity denial, it's important to clarify that Parfit doesn't necessarily deny collective identity. Instead, he focuses on personal identity concerning psychological states. Collective identity can still shape an individual's sense of self, but Parfit's arguments address the continuity and connectedness of an individual's psychological states over time.
The issue of responsibility in the context of collective identity is complex. When individuals act as part of a collective, it can become challenging to attribute responsibility to specific agents. None of that negates that individuals engage in singular internal reflection and make deliberate choices based on their values and beliefs, even if their collective affiliations influence them.
Regarding your question in the tenth paragraph, it is essential to acknowledge that others and their social contexts inevitably influence individuals. You have a concern here and I want to hear how it contributes to the discussion of Parfit’s work. I took exception to your characterization of that paragraph (and my tone later,) but that won’t get at your point – which I want to hear. I shaved hundreds of words and allusions but don’t mean to cut off discussion or yours, that was not my intention. However, this doesn't mean that personal identity claims are solely dependent on the presence of others. Personal identity can still be grounded in an individual's psychological continuity while also being shaped by their relationships and social environment.
Parfit's work primarily focuses on personal identity in the context of psychological continuity, it doesn't deny the role of collective identity and social relationships in shaping our sense of self. The complex interplay between individual and collective identity, and the attribution of responsibility, remains an important area of inquiry in philosophical discussions, just not Parfit’s. By all means proceed. Let’s discuss his work wherever you will.
I’m just trying to put down my impressions in my initial response here, but would like to hear yours without need of my own if that gets to the matter. I may not be right, but I am curious.
Tim
Daniel
Friday, March 17, 2023 -- 3:52 PM
--And curiosity is generated--And curiosity is generated by pleasure in contemplation rather than practical need. If both are described as psychological states, how do they overlap in this case? The feeling which is associated with curiosity can be understood as an effect of object-contemplation, whereas some pressing or urgent need, such as preparing for a quiz on the subject, is better described as a cause of one's interest regardless of the feeling which respective study produces. So do I understand you correctly if it is presumed from your statement that the grounds of topic association are constituted by feeling without practical interest? Is your interest in Parfitian ethics part of a larger private Hedonism?
Tim Smith
Saturday, March 18, 2023 -- 4:04 PM
Hey Daniel,Hey Daniel,
Regarding material and formal reasons for interest, my emphasis, and Parfit's, lies on the psychological continuity and connectedness that underpin personal identity. While material or formal reasons may contribute to one's interests or decisions, they do not solely define personal identity. The foundation of one's identity is due to overlapping psychological states and memories.
I'm persuaded by this approach if only to caveat the embodiment of the brain. Parfit does make concessions in his later work to this concern. I'm not following all his arguments there, however, or yours here, for that matter.
As for generational identity, it may influence individual choices and values; however, it is not the primary determinant of personal identity, nor fundamentally of interest to Parfit's thesis. Psychological continuity and connectedness take precedence over external factors such as generational identity or manner of dress. Once understood, however, there is far-reaching generational learning.
Both curiosity and practical need can contribute to shaping one's interests, but they don't necessarily determine personal identity. The focus should be on psychological continuity and connectedness, which includes the consistency of memories, beliefs, and values over time rather than the motivations behind one's interests.
Lastly, concerning private Hedonism, Parfit's work on ethics and personal identity does not endorse a hedonistic perspective. His theories aim to understand better personal identity, moral responsibility, and the relationships individuals have with their past and future selves. But by all means, study for your quiz first before responding here. But take pleasure in Derek's work when you return. That is what we are here to discuss.
If you have a different thesis, make it. Relate it to Parfit's. That would be a win-win. Don't let my portrayal of Parfit's work interfere with yours. At this point, I would like to hear your impressions of Parfit more than your reactions to mine. What do you think, having read his work?
Regards,
Tim
Daniel
Thursday, March 23, 2023 -- 4:52 PM
A major problem withA major problem with continuity and overlap of psychological facts as explanatory elements for personal-identity claims, referenced in your fourth paragraph above, is that there's no unequivocal way to link the identity which has them to the facts which require an identity to be what they are, namely, psychological. How do I know, for example, that my memories are my own? Couldn't they just as well be someone else's that I just happen to have for some reason? Or perhaps someone told me of a memory they have in such vivid terms that I later remember it as though my own, forgetting that it was someone else's. Or take another example. Why is it the case that when I stub my toe, someone else doesn't feel the pain? This could not depend on personal identity, because its occurrence wouldn't affect the claim's assumed veracity.
Tim Smith
Thursday, March 23, 2023 -- 8:08 PM
Hello Daniel,Hello Daniel,
Your concern about the uncertainty in linking psychological facts to personal identity is valid. The world is puzzling when you think about it. But Parfit's work is not a puzzle; it is a highly rigorous work on personal identity and its impact on our moral standing. Parfit's account of personal identity through psychological continuity and connectedness does address some of these issues, but his primary focus is not the certainty of personal identity. I'll do my best to answer, but I encourage you to look elsewhere if you want to question the notion of personal identity itself.
Parfit acknowledges the possibility of misattributed memories, as you mentioned in your example. He argues that personal identity is not just about possessing a particular set of memories but rather the continuity and connectedness of those memories over time. So, while some memories might be misattributed, the overall connectedness and coherence of one's psychological states contribute to personal identity.
Regarding the issue of why one person feels pain and another does not, Parfit's view on personal identity doesn't aim to explain why we have specific experiences or sensations. It is more focused on understanding the nature of personal identity through the relationships between psychological states over time. This approach allows for moral judgment where previous traditions drew from edict. If you instead focus on the implications of his view, it might entice you to reconsider his foundational arguments.
While Parfit's account of personal identity may not provide definitive answers to your questions, it offers a valuable framework for understanding the complex relationships between our psychological states, their role in shaping our identity, and most importantly, direction planning for and thinking about our future selves. The focus is on the continuity and connectedness of our memories, beliefs, and values rather than on the certainty of the origin of those psychological facts.
As always,
Tim
Larry Wornian
Wednesday, March 22, 2023 -- 6:04 PM
As a complete outsider to allAs a complete outsider to all this - I am a forensic neuropsychologist who was, eons ago, grounded in hermeneutics - I have long tried to put together a reading group on Derek Parfait. I have, in my library, Reasons and Persons, and volumes I and 2 of On What Matters. They are, literally, foundational for me: when I have a zoom interview with one of my incarcerated clients, they are the books on which my iPad sits to raise it to eye level. Seriously, I remain interested in the bits and pieces that I have been able to glean about Parfait's work, and the issue of moral reasoning has long been and continues to be critical to much of the work that I do. If there are those who would be willing to go through these works - I know it will take quite some time, but hey, all we have is time - I would be more than happy to work to put together a reading group on these works. Any interest?
Daniel
Thursday, March 23, 2023 -- 4:31 PM
Does the affirmation of thatDoes the affirmation of that inquiry remain currently not in evidence? Do you envision a non-existent group which you seek, or have you just joined one which is already here? For can one not claim that within the referenced area of interest an argument against partiality for the future, regarding one's own improvement, over the present and the past can be found? This argument states (by my reading) that it is more harmful than not to care about future events, merely because they haven't happened yet, than past or present ones, because we know much less about them. The fact that this epistemic lacuna can be compensated by optional determination through practical action in the present is precisely what makes them less important, in the same way that an imaginary image of a thing is less important than an actual thing which is observable. Might a return-question be accommodated, then, of the type which limits bias towards temporal station by asking: Is there any interest in adding the proposed work of the prospective group to that which is currently going on in the current one?
Larry Wornian
Thursday, March 23, 2023 -- 6:33 PM
I supposed I have alreadyI supposed I have already joined one, but I am immersed in profound ignorance of what is being discussed since I've not sipped from the well of those works I'd like to read and think about. Many interesting issues abound that you and Tim have discussed, but I'd like a better grasp and understanding of what Parfit actually says vs. what you interpret him to be saying. More in just a bit because a practical matter has come up - I've got to walk the dog! How's that for the press of real life, practical needs om service of others?
Tim Smith
Thursday, March 23, 2023 -- 8:55 PM
Hi Larry,Hi Larry,
My last dog passed over four years ago, and I still miss him. I feel more connected and continuous with those times than any other of my past selves. Emotion intensifies our humanity, and dogs know "what matters" if Derek doesn't.
There will be a blog on Dave Edmond's show, unattributed likely, and ready for Parfit wonderings. That may be an excellent place to query Parfit's work. I am reading volume one of 'On What Matters.' It is slow going and not easy for me.
I tried to make it to the 'The Philosophy of Smell' show. I live far away, but I do travel more now.
Hopefully, we can meet up at a live show soon.
Best,
Tim
Daniel
Monday, April 24, 2023 -- 2:30 PM
How will you know this personHow will you know this person if you see this person? Is this person already known to you? What if this person was your exact duplicate physiologically, but not the same person? In that case, you'd recognize this person as you recognize yourself, but only from the outside. In contrast to the branch-line case, you'd only recognize the surface-appearance. Isn't this similar to saying that you know you have a brain because you can think you do, and that this thought would be impossible without one? Isn't all you know about anyone's brain, including your own, just what it looks like and what someone told you it's supposed to do? In this way your desire to "meet up with" Larry is a little like wanting to see your own brain in order to verify that you have one, reassuring you that you haven't lost your brain if you forget something or neglect to think about it. In spite of the comfort this seems to provide for you, how does it differ from other traditions which explain thought-possibility as deriving from objects which are also observable only in terms of their external surfaces, such as moss on a riverbank, or gathering clouds after a sunrise? Aren't you just talking about a matter of correlation, and not causal dependency?
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