I don't want to take this analogy too far, and I'm still thinking about this show on other lines, but here is a rough correlation to human prediction and thought.

1. Data-related factors (AI) and Experience-related factors (Human):
-Insufficient training data (AI) ↔ Insufficient experience, exposure, or abuse (child abuse even) (Human)
-Inherent biases (AI) ↔ Innate cognitive biases or cultural influences (Human)
-Noise in training data (AI) ↔ Misleading or ambiguous information (Human)
-Human error in data annotation or preprocessing (AI) ↔ Errors in learning or memory formation (Human)
2. Model-related factors (AI) and Cognitive/Neural elements (Human):
-Overfitting (AI) ↔ Overgeneralization or confirmation bias (Human)
-Model architecture (AI) ↔ Neural architecture or cognitive structure (Human)
-Limitations of the model (AI) ↔ Limitations of human mental capacity or neural processing (Human)
Incomplete fine-tuning (AI) ↔ Incomplete learning or skill development (Human)
3. Algorithm-related factors (AI) and Cognitive/Decision-making factors (Human):
-Training objective misalignment (AI) ↔ Misaligned goals or values (Human)
-Randomness (AI) ↔ Noise or randomness in human decision-making (Human)
-Temperature settings (AI) ↔ Level of exploration vs. exploitation in decision-making (Human)
-Adversarial attacks (AI) ↔ Deceptive or manipulative information, let's say it blogging (Human)
4. User-related factors (AI) and Communication/Context factors (Human):
-Ambiguity in input (AI) ↔ Ambiguity in communication,context maybe even poetry or metaphor? (Human)

Andy Clark's term "hallucination" refers to the brain's predictive processing framework, wherein our perceptual experiences are constructed based on a combination of sensory input and prior knowledge or expectations. I don't want to get too off-base with the AI sense of the term, but I'm interested in the rage that AI has become with the advent of public large language models.

Note some of the analogies I draw here are worth more than others. Bias and insufficient training are strong correlations, while temperature settings seem wholly inappropriate, and yet collectively or in social contexts temperature correlates well with brainstorming or mob behavior.

I'm still going back over 'Surfing Uncertainty,' which is the only book I have read that I recall, and more and more I don't. I realize I could have read better. I hope this adds something here. Hallucination seems to be the wrong term for what the embodied mind does, given its proximity to the real world and the 10:1 feedforward : feedback white matter ratio. The prompts that PT sent out by email are very interesting, and this show is going to be even more so.

Is prediction premised on objective probability or subjective perception of likelihood? There is a tendency to assume the latter because the predictor must also be a perceiver. But the likelihood that the predictor is correct is determined by its probability independent of its being perceived. Take the probability before throwing a coin into the air, one side with the image of male human's head embossed upon it and the other the date of its being struck, of which side, head or date, would be facing upward after falling to the ground. The objective probability is 50% for each throw. But let's say person x throws it five times and each time it lands with the head-side up. It is perceived by this person much less likely that the coin will land head-side up after a sixth throw because the number of throws in the same series has increased, and the subjective perception of probability is applied to the series rather than the individual, adjusting to the objective decrease in probability of contiguous occurrences of identical outcomes. So let's say it lands with the date side up after the sixth throw as predicted. Person x is correct but only by overestimating the probability of a single throw's outcome. Does this make person x less likely to have been correct after the throw, making it less likely to have been successful and therefore specially informative if it is, and more likely to be successful before the throw on account of the unlikelihood of identical results in a random series? Has person x merely calibrated the unlikelihood of a post-hoc outcome to its likelihood beforehand? Is the posterior improbability of evidence for a given hypothesis, and therefore its informative value, inversely proportional to its prior probability of being found? If so, how could such an operation sufficiently confirm an hypothesis?

The loss of public phones, the old "phone booths", has been major shift described by a transfer of communication-resources from the public to the private sector. Now if communication is one of the tasks to which linguistic means is put, thinking can be said to be another. If replicas of linguistic thought products can be produced at levels sufficient for wide distribution, would this not constitute a similar shift in thinking which has occurred in communication resources? Is so called "artificial intelligence" (a term which of course must exclude any association with the term "consciousness") little more than an effort by concentrations of private power within the financial and technology sectors to privatize the public mind? --But here's the thing which I find so interesting: If one's private experience internally or "epistemic action" externally (cf. "The Extended Mind", Clark/Chalmers, p. 8) is characterized by optional results which are possible only on the basis and in the context of non-optional foundations the majority of which are shared collectively, and that this sector of the shared part of mind, (which might in passing be called the domain of "cultural objects"), constitutes the largest part of it, or the part with the most contents, then is it not the case that such an attempt at mind-privatization is just the latest attempt to get rid of thinking altogether insofar as such a thing is accessible in public contexts? Could one say that any deliberate creation of such a replica must necessarily be controlled by the will to replace what it imitates? Is intelligence generated artificially of its essence anti-intellectual?

So how do you know they're both yours? If lack of agreement is co-emergent with a distinction between a currently observable, (observable in principle, anyway), functioning brain and the recollections and imaginings which generate cross-modal inferences of past experience understanding, then how can one claim that each belongs to a singular subject which refers to them both, as you have above?

The solution seems to be to semantically disentangle the term "thinking" from the means of cognition. One way this is accomplished is by translating the phenomenon of consciousness of time described in the final sentence above into a model of how this phenomenon is produced, locating this process in the brain and, as a mechanism, understanding it as the means of perception of time-relations in the context of complex biological systems. The phenomenon can be described as holding on to something that's leaving, getting ready for something that's coming, and getting hit with something that's here. Although these are simultaneous intentions of the individual, at very minute levels this characteristic of being intended can be exaggerated so that memory and anticipation of individual experience as distinguished from retention and prediction of sensory input is not categorical.

If this can be shown or, if not, heuristically assumed, the brain can be described in a biological sense as the mechanism by means of which time-awareness is generated in the organism. The first task would be to preclude any application of the designation of analytic judgement by the claim that all judgements are synthetic.* The second is to distinguish between those which have aposteriori or apriori grounds, i.e. with or without the aid of experience. If prediction can in a not less than strict sense be made apriori, then occurring sense-perception and retention of what's perceived can be said to be made on aposteriori grounds. Because immediate perception is limited in range, import capacity, etc., only a much smaller quantity of stimuli can be retained, as when material is pushed through a mesh. The apriori predictions must correspondingly be very selective, even if they are described as occurring so rapidly that they are sub-personal, (to avoid using the term "sub-conscious"), and come to be made by a spontaneous and pervasive distrust of everything which is given without them. Because this process is describable without any deliberate intervention by the organism, it can be called a mechanism and as such be found in domain independence of brain functioning. Now if prediction functions to exclude almost everything that is given in reality outside the mechanism, continually readjusting to aposteriori post mesh retention, the cognitive product, when compared to what prediction must dismiss, can not incorrectly be called an "hallucination".

Is this plausible? How does it compare to your sweeping claim in the post of 3/9/23 above that cognitive function generates models of reality rather than hallucinations which ignore it?
__________
* The distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions is of course not affected by the naturalization of truth conditions.

--Nor can it be limited by properties belonging to objects which are not perceived. Compare seeing a grey dog with imagining one. In both cases the same judgement is made with regards to object's color, and differ only in how the object is already there, or its "given-ness". One satisfies a criterion of plenary intuitive correspondence and the other of comparatively empty correspondence, but they are distinguished only by degrees, where one predominates more than the other, and therefore do not constitute different kinds of objects, but rather describe a sequence where imaginative form passes over into intuitive content, and intuitive content in turn reoccurs in conceptually regenerated form, retaining the judgement of its intuited properties originally predicted. Is this compatible with Russel's theory of descriptions mentioned in the fourth paragraph of your 3/29/23 7:35 am post? Let's say the name of the grey dog in the example is "Fido". A correct description of that situation would be stated as "Fido is a dog which is grey". Because "dog" describes a set of objects to which Fido belongs, it constitutes an indication of Fido which is qualitatively degenerate in that it can only pick out a few basic qualities of the individual, while at the same time it represents a greater quantitative extension of the reference. What is lost in qualitative intension is gained by quantitative extension. But to understand the relevance to the individual to the set, such sources of intuitive contents must be both spontaneously, or "sub-personally", predicted and retained by imaginative means. Rather than describing human cognitive resources then as a controlled hallucination, would it be better stated along the lines of Russel's theory as a constrained imagination?