Is there more than one kind of science? Your distinction between the world and existence seems to suggest it. How does evidence for the latter differ, if at all, from the former?

To clarify, one can imagine two distinct varieties of evidence for two different kinds of truth-claims, as in the following examples:
1) With respect to a planet, "the earth revolves around the sun".
2) With respect to a hand-painted portrait, "that is a good likeness".

Does (2) derive from something already known, i.e. what a person looks like, and (1) from something not (at some time) known, i.e. that rotation is ascribable to the earth rather than the sun? What's known in the first example concerns the recognition of another person, hence at the same time a kind of indirect self-recognition, whereas in the second example the unknown thing consists of which body rotates around the other; --but that one or the other must do so is already known. What's known in each case corresponds to your distinction between the world (earth and sun), and existence (people, amongst whom occurs the person who makes such a distinction). Shouldn't there obtain a separate science for this latter, given that a separate domain of objects can claim categorical distinctness? --Or better, can it be said that any claim of determination by the sciences of nature over all object-domains could itself be a superstition?

The distinction you draw in this very good analysis concerns the relation between certainty and evidence. In the first part evidence falls short of the certainty-demand on account a pronounced evidomorphism. In the second, any evidence-demand impedes the kind of certainty which is desired. Could there be a third relation which brings the two together in a single explanation of science-rejectionism? What about cases where no certainty-demand or -desire exists, while nevertheless abundant evidence for it exists to the extent that it is habitually ignored?

--So if learning produces the knowing, and doing generates the learning, what produces the doing? If you're trying to say that reliability of the results of scientific research are compatible with the truth of the stated claims upon which their explanation is based, but does not necessarily imply them, on account of their shifting boundaries, then you've left out how they're comparable in the first place. Didn't the shifting truth-claims come first, and the associated stability of their reliability only afterwards? It that's the case, it must describe a causal relationship between a good theory and a reliable practical application. Are you here describing, then, a post-hoc loss of stability in theory by a persisting practical stability in application reliability? Could this constitute a constructive response to Ray's question about truth/reliability-circularity?

--There are of course cases where the practice precedes the theory, as for example the invention of the steam-engine occurring before the theory of entropy, or technology of fire preceding the discovery of oxygen. The causal connection, however, proceeds in the same direction, after the initial theoretical explanation of the phenomenon which characterizes the respective practice.

So certainty is a state of being certain, and certitude is an attitude which accommodates, or is conducive to, certainty-states? --And this makes ideology, religion, and science different certitudes, each of which has its own special properties with regards to what one is certain of, like different kinds of certainty-fruits which can be each put in their own certitude basket? Do I have that right? What about the reality-inconsistency among origins mentioned towards the end? Do the trees which produce the certainty-fruit which are put in the certitude-baskets have roots which are not certain at all? Your analysis seems to indicate such a suggestion.

So one can gather from your view that all knowledge and belief, because it must have origins of different varieties at different times which have no reality until what they are origins of exist as properties of thought-contents, contain or produce irreconcilable attitudes on account of the fact that their origins are ontologically deficient, as deriving from the conscious orientation towards those properties which exists plenarily, so that any conflict between two sets of attitudes generated by ontologically deficient origins can not be reconciled on account of the fact that reconciliation between unreal entities makes no sense. Is that correct?

Perhaps sketching the point out schematically may garner some assistance. Your claim as I interpret it is that there can be no reconciliation between religion, science, and ideology because they don't exist as self-identical, propositional contents. Rather these exist or constitute part of the world only where there's an attitude which regards them in some way. By implication, then, propositional contents derive from propositional attitudes, and not the other way around. These contents in the given examples can be (for purposes of completeness) stated in summary form:
(a) Religion: origin and destiny of the world.
(b) Science: inter-subjectively sharable statements the conclusions for which are demonstrable under limited conditions repeatable over time.
(c) Ideology: index of sociological precepts under unverified headings.

From the above-stated understanding that one can have an attitude without a proposition but not a proposition without an attitude (expressible below by an apostrophe (')); and that the attitudes which one can have about a given proposition are potentially infinite in number, the existence of the three propositional contents in the example can be written as:
(a),(a', a'', a'''...)
(b),(b', b'', b'''...)
(c),(c', c'', c'''...)

Although (a) + (b) + (c) is logically permissible, the three attitudinal series, from which their existence (for humans; as part of the world; in time; etc.) necessarily derives, can not be added together on account of the fact that no two infinite series are commensurable. If my analysis here is accurate to your meaning, is there not a little sardonic wit in the final two words- "much more"?

Are you referring to human beings? Is the distinction between the natural and human sciences merely conventional in your view, or does it derive from the kinds of objects studied? As you point out, natural science has done a good job in giving us the ability to destroy ourselves. Could human science do the same?

So let's see if I understand what you're saying. Trust in science results in deception of humanity, because the practical extrapolations which originate from its discoveries are so useful that one forgets where they came from, so that one believes whatever it says afterwards without having to know the details of any reasons why such useful things exist. And because it's unwise to trust anything which one doesn't know the reasons for, science can't be trusted. Is that about right? If so, where does that leave those who know the reasons? If they tried to tell you, would you want to listen? And if that's the case, then the second part of your argument, which I read as stating that because prior successes in scientific research are not by that alone a reliable indicator of future successes (cf. the second and sixth paragraphs above), could be confirmed or disconfirmed by doing so. Leaving aside the issue of science/religion- compatibility, (which, in passing, doesn't make much sense from a phenomenological perspective, as their cohabitation pre-dates the distinction between them), the recommendation against trust in this part of the argument arises from the perception of an over-zealousness of cultural enthusiasm for theoretical capability, which in turn informs the claim made by ethics and practices in your final point as pre-conditioning endorsability of research-justification, on account of the fact that some ethical duties will always override theoretical goals of research.

Assuming for the sake of argument that my paraphrase is accurate, you're asserting two different things here which in no way appear compatible. On the one hand science can't be trusted because of an over-reliance on its usefulness, and on the other, science has to be listened to in order to determine whether it's ethical or not. Doesn't the first destroy the possibility of the second? If you care so much about the ethics of science, how can you know what it's doing if you can't believe what it's saying?